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I
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, both formal and informal initiatives have promoted the
inclusion of apologies in medical education and clinical practices. Many
countries have even regulated medical apologies through law. Although there
has been much discussion of the potential for apology to promote efficiency and
the conditions for a successful apology, the focus has mainly remained the
doctor–patient relationship.1 The literature and many intervention programs
have focused on the interactions between doctors and patients after a medical
mistake has occurred or some harm has resulted. These interactions have been
conceptualized in individualistic settings, with almost no discussion of the
collective and cultural dimensions of apology. Moreover, no reference has been
made to cases of apology following collective trauma caused by public health
activities. These cases involve state activities such as human experimentation or
public health interventions that went wrong and are fundamentally different
from the usual doctor–patient interaction.
In this article, we explore the role of apologies in healthcare systems from a
broader perspective. The article begins by exploring the current state of
apology within the healthcare system and tries to point out the limitations of the
current individualistic point of view under which medical apologies are
conceptualized. The article offers to overcome these limitations and enrich the
existing discourse by referring to the cultural and collective aspects of apology.
It addresses the significance of apology in terms of social solidarity and
demonstrates the ways in which each apology situation entails a clash between
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cultural identities. Next, the main part of the article expands the debate on
apology by presenting a public health perspective of apologies following
collective traumatic events such as the application of sterilization laws or flawed
human experimentations in various settings. The article shows how some public
health apologies have failed to address the cultural dimension of a healthcare
problem and how an emphasis on this dimension can help the public health
practice of apology. Finally, the article returns to apologies in the clinical setting
and shows the relevance of culture and identity concerns in this more common
context. We claim that the public health perspective of apologies should enrich
discussion of the more individualistic-oriented clinical medical apologies. Our
analysis also has implications for introducing health-related apologies into
medical and legal education and everyday practices.
II
APOLOGIES IN THE HEALTHCARE SYSTEM: CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS
A. Apologies and the Law
Apology is traditionally considered as a private act and usually not
encouraged or enforced by legal institutions.2 Apology is considered an aspect
of interpersonal relationships, while the role of modern law is to externalize
broken interpersonal relationships when individuals are unable to settle
disputes on their own.3 The notion of the rule of law is based on alienated
relationships between separate individuals who are governed by law and
possess legal rights.4 Apology, under a classic formal perception of law, is
unnecessary since the legal determination of rights is supposed to balance the
wrong by giving a remedy and officially regulating the relationship between the
parties. Apology is usually presented as a speech act—an act that a speaker
performs by uttering words that produce a particular effect in the addressee.5
Yet apology can fail or succeed depending on whether basic conditions are met.

2. One exception, however, is in the area of defamation suits. See Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur
Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 461, 478–79 (1986).
3. For a famous definition of the rule of law emphasizing this notion of formal legality, see
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944) (“Stripped of all technicalities, this means
that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules which make
it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given
circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.”).
4. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY (2004);
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210–31 (1979). See also
THANE ROSENBAUM, THE MYTH OF MORAL JUSTICE 191–92 (2004) (“The law is about the
adjudication of rights, the assignment of liability, the determination of guilt and innocence, the serving
of jail time, the payment of compensation. This is what the law means by a legal resolution. Law is not
about the repair of relationships, the moral duties owed to and shared by our fellow human beings.”).
5. Summer Inst. Of Linguistics, Inc. Int’l, What Is a Speech Act?, LINGUALINKS, http://
www.sil.org/LINGUISTICS/GlossaryOfLinguisticTerms/WhatIsASpeechAct.htm (last visited Dec. 28,
2009).
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Apology as a speech act in modern culture6 requires a few conditions7 in order
to be authentic and achieve full expression. The conditions of apology are
usually stipulated as follows:8
1. Acknowledgement that a legitimate rule, moral norm, or social
relationship was broken. Proper acknowledgement of the offense
includes the identity of the offender and appropriate details of the
9
offense.
2. Acceptance of responsibility for the violation, thereby conveying an
understanding of the nature of the wrong done and the impact it
had on the receiver. This condition includes an explanation for
committing the offense.
3. Expression of regret by communicating guilt, anxiety, shame,
remorse, forbearance, or sympathy for having committed the
10
offense.
4. Offer of reparation for the harm caused by the offense.

6. The Greek root of the word apology implied a defense. Although “formal justification” or
“excuse” remain definitions for the word apology, “[t]he more generally accepted modern usage of the
word . . . is ‘an expression of error or discourtesy accompanied by an expression of regret.’” Max
Bolstad, Learning from Japan: The Case for Increased Use of Apology in Mediation, 48 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 545, 546 (2000). Our reference to speech acts is based on J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH
WORDS (2d ed. 1975).
7. Shoshana Blum-Kulka & Elite Olshtain, Requests and Apologies: A Cross-Cultural Study of
Speech Act Realization Patterns (CCSARP), 5 APPLIED LINGUISTICS 196, 207 (1984) (“[T]he apology
speech act set includes four potential strategies for performing the act of apologizing: (1) an
explanation or account of the cause which brought about the offen[s]e; (2) an expression of the
[Speaker]’s responsibility for the offen[s]e; (3) an offer of repair; (4) a promise of forbearance.”).
8. For examples of such formulations, see ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC 113 (1971);
NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION 19–20
(1991); Alfred Allan, Apology in Civil Law: A Psycho-Legal Perspective, 14 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. &
L. 5, 7–8 (2007); Deborah L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165,
1172–75 (1997); Donna L. Pavlick, Apology and Mediation: The Horse and Carriage of the Twenty-First
Century, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 829, 835–36 (2003).
9. Aaron Lazare, Apology in Medical Practice: An Emerging Clinical Skill, 296 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 1401, 1402 (2006).
10. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102
MICH. L. REV. 460, 468 (2003) (“In its fullest form, the apology has several elements: expression of
embarrassment and chagrin; clarification that one knows what conduct had been expected and
sympathizes with the application of negative sanction; verbal rejection, repudiation, and disavowal of
the wrong way of behaving along with vilification of the self that so behaved; espousal of the right way
and an avowal henceforth to pursue that course; performance of penance and the volunteering of
restitution.”). See also AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY 23 (2004) (“‘Apology’ refers to an encounter
between two parties in which one party, the offender, acknowledges responsibility for an offense or
grievance and expresses regret or remorse to a second party, the aggrieved. Each party may be a person
or a larger group such as a family, a business, an ethnic group, a race, or a nation. The apology may be
private or public, written or verbal, and even, at times, nonverbal.”); Lazare, supra note 9, at 1402
(“The third part of an apology is the expression of remorse, shame, forbearance, and humility.”); Levi,
supra note 8, at 1177 (noting apology may be viewed “as a corrective ritual performed by two subjects
in order to redress a moral power imbalance between them”).
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As the conditions above suggest, apology in western thought is both
individualistic and moralistic. It includes acknowledgment of a wrong and
transformation of the interpersonal relationship through a sequence of acts. It
might occur between parties on the private level, but is not susceptible to
genuine enforcement or regulation by law. Law begins when the dynamic of
private relationship ends and parties pursue their rights in courts. The courts
determine their rights and, traditionally, will not enforce interpersonal
reconciliation through apology. Apologizing signifies a human gesture beyond
the structural relationships created by law.
B. Apologies in the Healthcare System
Medical malpractice lawyers usually recommend silence when their
physician clients are sued for a medical error, especially one leading to serious
injury or death. This approach is based on the common assumption that
admitting responsibility for any error simply sets the stage for a prolonged
lawsuit and massive settlement.11 Behind this assumption lies the dichotomy
presented above, whereby apology is relegated to private interactions while law
is the primary tool for handling institutional and professional interactions. A
healthcare provider is not supposed to apologize even if she feels the need to do
so, since the legal consequences of such an act will be liability and high damages
for the hospital. Such costs, according to traditional legal thinking, should only
be the product of due process of law through presentation of evidence and
application of strict legal procedures.
Recently, more and more voices are trying to change the incentive not to
apologize by promoting disclosure of medical errors and presenting apology as
both an ethically and professionally responsible act. Apology under this
perception is presented as a reasonable choice stemming from utilitarian
motives and a crucial way to improve patient safety and quality of care.12 In
order to encourage medical apologies, several countries have introduced
apology laws to reduce the concerns regarding the legal implications of
disclosure and apology.13 In the American context, these laws have been in place
since the 1990s, mainly as a part of efforts to enhance medical error reporting
and patient safety. An important document representing the change in medical
11. Noni MacDonald & Amir Attaran, Medical Errors, Apologies and Apology Laws, 180 CAN.
MED. ASS’N J. 11, 11 (2009).
12. Ashley A. Davenport, Forgive and Forget: Recognition of Error and Use of Apology as
Preemptive Steps to ADR or Litigation in Medical Malpractices Cases, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 81, 107
(2006) (concluding that a practice of apologizing effectively may result in “a team-based atmosphere
that ultimately reduces errors and protects patients”). See also Lauris C. Kaldjian et al., An Empirically
Derived Taxonomy of Factors Affecting Physicians’ Willingness to Disclose Medical Errors, 21 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 942, 943 (2006) (finding ninety-one factors recognized in existing literature that
impede or facilitate physicians’ willingness to disclose errors); Lee Taft, Apology and Medical Mistake:
Opportunity or Foil?, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 55, 85 (2005) (“Discussing errors openly creates
educational opportunities that help others avoid similar mistakes in the future.”).
13. Some countries, such as New Zealand, Finland, Denmark, and Sweden, have no-fault
compensation systems.
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culture with respect to medical errors and the proper response to such errors
was the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) report, To Err is Human: Building a
Safer Health System.14 This document broke the silence that has surrounded
medical errors and their consequences by recognizing that “to err is human”
and refusing to blame well-intentioned healthcare professionals for making
honest mistakes.15 Instead, the committee aimed to promote an agenda for
reducing medical errors and improving patient safety through the design of a
safer health system. Although the report prominently notes the rough legal
atmosphere surrounding medical errors, it does not seriously question the
current legal framework; rather, the report perceives the framework more as a
constraint within which the design of more efficient workplaces and
encouragement of disclosure for future preventions of mistakes must operate.
The report considers the problem in the context of (1) rising numbers of
medical errors, with more people dying in a given year in the United States as a
result of medical errors than from motor vehicle accidents, breast cancer, or
AIDS; (2) rising costs of medical care, including litigation costs; (3) increasingly
technology-oriented hospitals and healthcare interactions; and (4) growing
alienation between patients and physicians. While this context invites the idea
of reducing these rising tensions, the term apology cannot be found in the IOM
report; instead, the main framework is patient safety.
Apology within the healthcare system is unique in that situations which call
for apology constantly occur within public institutional settings such as hospitals
or community healthcare services. Thus, apology in the context of healthcare
services transcends its interpersonal quality and becomes a target for regulation
and careful design. Another important characteristic of apology within the
healthcare system is the inherent structural imbalance between patients and
healthcare providers. Patients are, by definition, less powerful, unfamiliar with
the system, less knowledgeable, and less able to control the interaction with
healthcare providers.
It can be argued that apology regulation aims to encourage doctors and
healthcare providers to develop more sincere human interaction with their
patients without fear of sanction by law for such efforts. In other words, legal
regulations may provide a safe area where sincere human gestures will not have
legal consequences. Healthcare apologies are designed in ways that neutralize
the legal consequences—as expected in private apologies—and still enable the
advantages of amicable dispute resolution without legal litigation. Although
there is an acknowledgement of the importance of apology in transforming
relationships and improving healthcare services,16 many of the current legal

14. TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000).
15. Id. at 5.
16. Lazare describes ten healing mechanisms effected by apology: restoration of self respect and
dignity; feeling cared for; restoration of power; suffering in the offender; validation that the offense
occurred; designation of fault; assurance of shared values; entering into a dialogue with the offender;
reparations; and a promise for the future. Lazare, supra note 9, at 1402. For an additional discussion of
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arrangements fail to construct circumstances permitting apologies to follow all
of the conditions above and, thus, do not produce effective apologies.17
Regarding acknowledgement of the wrong, many countries only exempt
benevolent expressions. Thus, physicians and hospitals may fear liability
depending on the type of apology they offer.18 When the law enables only an
expression of sympathy and does not include acknowledgement of wrongdoing,
an apology might lead to worse outcomes than the expected legal dispute.19 The
condition of acceptance of responsibility is also not covered by apology law:
even when apology regulation exempts the acknowledgment of a wrong, it will
rarely encourage acceptance of responsibility for that wrong.20 An apologetic act
might also fail when remorse is expressed in reserved, legal language and
reparation is offered, not as full compensation, but only as a symbolic act.
The difficulties of regulating apology through special exemption clauses and
the imposition of duties to report on medical errors are related to the overemphasized contrast between apology and law nurtured by mainstream legal
culture. In contrast to this gap, an alternative legal culture presenting mediation
as the primary legal method to deal with healthcare disputes has the potential of
transforming relationships without falling into individualistic assumptions of
apology and law.21 The most effective healthcare apology might be possible
within a mediation process due to its confidentiality.22 When statements made in
the course of mediation are privileged under state law, they can be excluded

the healing aspects of apology, see generally Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of
Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135 (2000); Lee Taft, On Bended Knee (With Fingers Crossed), 55 DEPAUL L.
REV. 601 (2006).
17. See Lazare, supra note 9, at 1402 (“All [four] parts are not necessarily present in every effective
apology, but when an apology is ineffective, one can invariably locate the defect in [one] or more of
these [four] parts.”).
18. These fears are reflected in state legislation impacting the legal effect of apologies. For
example, in 1986, Massachusetts enacted a rule of evidence that rendered inadmissible “[s]tatements,
writings, or benevolent gestures expressing sympathy or a general sense of benevolence” as evidence of
an admission of liability in a civil action. Davenport, supra note 12, at 98. Other states have equivalent
rules.
19. Mastroianni, supra note 1, at 1614 (“Our analysis reveals that most [state disclosure] laws have
structural weaknesses that may discourage comprehensive disclosures and apologies and weaken the
laws’ impact on malpractice suits.”).
20. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What We Know and Don’t Know About the Role of Apologies in
Resolving Health Care Disputes, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1009, 1013 (2005) (referring to an Oregon
statute’s provision that “any expression of regret or apology made by or on behalf of [a licensed
medical provider] . . . does not constitute an admission of liability for any purpose”).
21. For a presentation of mediation as transcending individualism with a basis in a relational
worldview, see generally ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF
MEDIATION: THE TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT (1st ed. 2004). For a discussion of the
importance of a relational worldview in mediation, see Michal Alberstein, Forms of Mediation and
Law: Cultures of Dispute Resolution, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 321, 365–66 (2007); Ran Kuttner,
Human, Not Too Human: Why Is Mediation a Profound Alternative to the Legal Proceedings?, in 50
STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 139, 156–59 (Austin Sarat ed., 2009).
22. Bolstad, supra note 6, at 574. See also Deborah Levi, Why Not Just Apologize? How to Say
You’re Sorry in ADR, 18 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 147, 163, 165–68 (2000) (noting the
potential for benefit from apologies in mediation settings and factors maximizing that potential).
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from admissibility. Many states have such exclusionary provisions, since
mediation fundamentally seeks to overcome the rigidity and alienation of the
law by encouraging enclaves of private interactions protected by law. Indeed,
mediation is probably the preferred forum to encourage an apology23 within the
healthcare system, but since entrance into, and participation in, the process
require informed consent, not all healthcare apologies can be handled by this
process.
To summarize, other than mediation, which is, in fact, a return to the
private, individualistic notion of apology as unregulated by law, healthcare
regulations usually fail to enable a full transformative apology when no
mediation is conducted.24 The examples in this section show how, under an
individualistic perspective of apology, where assumption of the speech act is
supposed to transform interpersonal relationships, restrained apology fails to
meet the necessary conditions for transformation and sometimes can become an
insufficient act which may produce further dispute and misunderstanding.25 In
the following part, we will show how a more collective notion of apology and
healthcare practice can help improve this situation.
III
BEYOND INDIVIDUALISTIC APOLOGY: THE RELEVANCE OF IDENTITY AND
CULTURE
A. Collectivist Apology
The conditions of apology stipulated in the previous section do not apply
universally, and in some cultures, which are usually characterized as collectivist,
apology does not focus on the interpersonal private transformation between
two individuals. The collectivist notion of apology will be posited here in order
to develop the notion of apology as an act of restoring social solidarity, which
has importance even in cases when some formal conditions of apology have not
been met.26

23. Pavlick, supra note 8, at 857.
24. Note, however, the exception of Hawaii, where the statement of the purpose of the apology bill
explicitly references the limitations of an individualistic perception: “Particularly in our State, The
Aloha State, it is regrettable that members of our statewide community cannot reach out to others in a
human way without fear of having such a communication used subsequently as an admission of
liability.” S. Res. 1339, 24th Leg. (Haw. 2007). The final legislation enacted provides that “[e]vidence of
statements or gestures that express sympathy, commiseration, or condolence concerning the
consequences of an event in which the declarant was a participant is not admissible to prove liability for
any claim growing out of the event.” HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1 (2007) [hereinafter Apology Statute].
25. But see Elizabeth Latif, Note, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored Toward Legal
Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REV, 289, 311–20 (2001) (describing the potential beneficial effects of even the
potentially imperfect apologies observed in legal settings).
26. In Japan, for example, “apologizing is a sign of an individual’s desire to restore or maintain a
positive relationship with the other party despite the temporarily disruptive harmful act.” Bolstad,
supra note 6, at 553. For a comparative analysis of apologies in South Korea, Japan, and the United
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In contrast to the first condition of apology posited in the previous section,
there is no strict emphasis on wrongdoing under the collectivist notion: a person
can apologize without necessarily pointing to a breached norm or an excuse for
the breach. In eastern thought, “reasoning embraces contradictions among
objects in a yin[–]yang field of constant change.”27 It is a more holistic mode of
causation. While westerners base responsibility on culpability, easterners
“highlight consequences.”28 When something bad occurs, both parties apologize,
one before the other. These are, of course, only rough characterizations that do
not imply rigid dichotomies, as a range of possible reactions exists in various
cultures.
Referring to the second condition of apology, the sincerity of the apology is
less important than its offering in accordance with prescribed social
interaction.29 The apology, sincere or not, signifies an acceptance of the rules of
social behavior and a willingness to conform to those rules in the future. The
two parties to the apologetic act take part in this affirmation. There is greater
homogeneity and emphasis on maintaining social order. A collectivist apology
emphasizes amendment of the social order and harmony as its central values.
The Japanese, for example, use a wide range of apology words to suit the social
status of the offender and the offended. They discourage explanations and
excuses for behaviors. The Japanese apology communicates “submissiveness,
humility and meekness.”30
It is easier to understand the counter-individualistic notion of apology by
examining collectivist societies. In such societies, apologies serve as a primary
method to transform disputes in the public sphere and are an important ritual
which may happen in court. Some such societies may utilize mediation and
other alternative methods as primary dispute resolution mechanisms. In these
societies, we would expect apologies to be a central tool for transforming
disputes.
As a society places more emphasis on collectivist values, its inclination to
regulate apology might avoid its specific individualistic conditions while
supporting its social value as a tool for solidarity promotion and amendment of

States, see generally Ilhyung Lee, The Law and Culture of the Apology in Korean Dispute Settlement
(With Japan and the United States in Mind), 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2005).
27. Peter Hays Gries & Kaiping Peng, Culture Clash? Apologies East and West, 11 J. CONTEMP.
CHINA 173, 175 (2002).
28. Id. See also LAZARE, supra note 10, at 32 (“Japanese apologies are focused primarily on
restoring the relationship with the offended party, rather than on relieving an internal state of mind,
such as guilt, which is more characteristic of person-to-person American apologies.”).
29. LAZARE, supra note 10, at 32–33 (“The Japanese are also more likely to offer and receive
apologies than Americans and will often apologize even when the other is at fault.”).
30. Id. at 33. See also Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 466–67 (“In a society that emphasizes
group membership as a basis for personal identity, it is important to maintain the sense of ‘insideness’
after a rupturing conflict. There must be a ceremony of restoration to mark the reestablishment of
harmony. . . . [A]n apology, and best of all[,] a mutual apology, are even better as the explicit
acknowledgement of commitment to future behavior consonant with group values.”).
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social fractures.31 On the other hand, supporting a full apology that fulfills all the
formal conditions but exempts any legal consequence might undermine its
social value and make it an empty gesture. Thus, cultural change can be
encouraged largely through educational acts and active consciousness-raising
and not necessarily through legal regulation. The shift beyond individualism in
this context does not have to be extreme and assume a collectivist framework as
a new setting. A more dialectic perception of self and other within a relational
setting might be more appropriate for encouraging new forms of apology.
B. Organizational Concerns and Apology Training
Some problems with the infiltration of apology into the healthcare arena
relate to a lack of training of healthcare professionals to conduct apology in a
proper way. Even deeper difficulties emerge from the common construction of
the medical professional identity nourished by medical education, which does
not support disclosure and apologies. According to a recent study, medical
trainees frequently do not disclose mistakes, and faculty physicians are
underprepared to teach communication skills related to disclosure and apology.
This fact was reflected in a survey that found that nearly two-thirds of medical
trainees and more than two-thirds of faculty physicians who reported making
medical mistakes did not apologize.32 The authors concluded that, “[a]t a time of
increased attention to disclosure, actual faculty and trainee practices suggest
that role models, support systems, and education strategies are lacking.”33
Hence, the authors developed an interactive educational program for trainees
and faculty physicians that (1) assesses experiences, attitudes, and perceptions
about error; (2) explores the human impact of error through filmed patient and
family narratives; (3) develops communication skills; and (4) offers a strategy to
facilitate bedside disclosures.
Since everyday medical practice involves multiple individualistic, alienated
interactions, legal regulation of the doctor–patient relationship seeking to
encourage apology might fail to achieve its goals due to a lack of appropriate
cultural change encouraged by appropriate training. Such training can begin
with more relational education, which emphasizes care and solidarity. It can

31. See, e.g., Apology Statute, supra note 24. For a discussion of the problems created by
incomplete exemption of apologies as evidence in legal proceedings, see Jonathan R. Cohen,
Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 819, 842–44, 850–51 (2002).
32. Sigall K. Bell et al., Improving the Patient, Family, and Clinician Experience After Harmful
Events: The “When Things Go Wrong” Curriculum, 85 ACAD. MED. 1010, 1012 (2010). See also
Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Disclosing Harmful Medical Errors to Patients, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED.
2713, 2716 (2007) (claiming that “top-down regulation” will likely be less successful than disclosure
programs that “emerge locally, are driven by an institutional leadership and a workforce committed to
transparency, and focus on providing health care workers with the skills needed to conduct these
difficult conversations well”).
33. Bell, supra note 32, at 1010 (noting summary of findings in abstract).
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continue with workshops and concrete training programs for various healthcare
providers.34
Furthermore, apologies are usually presented from the doctors’ point of
view—how difficult it is for doctors to say “I am sorry,” how the current
medical competitive and stressful environment impedes an open disclosure of
medical errors. This depiction is limited due to the exclusion of other
professionals within the systems, such as nurses,35 health managers, and, most
importantly, the patients themselves.
In some cases, organizational and policy considerations result in a cultural
change which encourages an enriched notion of apology.36 As discussed above, it
seems that, in most cases, a requirement that hospitals or physicians disclose
medical errors is not enough for the development of a significant apology
practice. Even if the initial motivations for the apology practice are efficiency
and cost cutting, it is clear that these reforms also aim to promote an
organizational change in the long run. With time, we will have a better
perspective to consider if this move proves to encourage the desired cultural
organizational change.37
C. Cultural Dimensions and Public Apologies
Apology is not a universally neutral interaction. Any healthcare
interaction—even one performed in a relatively individualistic setting such as
that of one doctor to one patient—has its specific context. The patient’s own
context, stemming from her identification with a specific community, her
previous interaction with the medical system, and her current perspective on
the events, must be taken into consideration. Is she really interested in an
apology and its construction? Is the patient coming from a community that has
suffered past medical injustices? What are the gender inequalities that might
exist for this specific patient? These questions are of course context-specific,
and the answers can and should be very different in any case after careful,
sensitive analysis of the cultural context. Apology training should not merely
focus on imposing a universal manual which follows the basic abstract
conditions for apology, accompanied by legal considerations. Instead, some
34. One example of such programming is this symposium and its participants. See also Charity
Scott, Foreword: Therapeutic Approaches to Conflict Resolution in Health Care Settings, 21 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 797, 814–15 (2005) (describing new initiatives for professional education).
35. Dale M. Pfrimmer, Nursing’s Role in Disclosure and Apology, 41 J. CONTINUING EDUC.
NURSING 342, 343 (2010) (calling for the inclusion of nurses in disclosure training).
36. For example, Cohen describes a successful healthcare reform attributable to several
organizational differences. He refers to a case where the hospital was able to transform its approach to
medical mistakes and their disclosure to patients and family members due to the reduced liability
exposure for the hospital, the lack of personal liability for physicians, and the hospital’s self-insurance,
among other factors. Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example from
Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1447, 1469–73 (2000).
37. Bolstad, supra note 6, at 560. See also Davenport, supra note 12, at 90–92, 96, 106 (providing an
overview of the current systems in practice and possible suggestions for improvement). See generally
Gallagher, supra note 32.
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initial inquiry should be devoted to the construction of the process itself after
interviewing the parties involved. In the United States, for example, a long
history of suspicion exists between the African-American community and the
medical system that must be taken into consideration.38 Similar issues exist in
other countries with respect to other minorities.39
These considerations bring forward the questions of identity and its
construction within the apology process. Public apologies of governments and
political leaders regarding wrongs done to groups belong to a particular
category of cases.40 The apology in these cases does not aim to primarily
emphasize individual rights, although there might be an element of admitting
fault. Instead, the emphasis is on the group rather than the individual, and the
ultimate goal is to strengthen the community. “Race apologies” are
paradigmatic illustrations of collectivist goals.41 As medicine and public health
have had a crucial role in the history of race construction throughout history,
the collective dimension of apology is possibly an integral part of the process,
depending on the issue discussed.
IV
A CASE STUDY OF PUBLIC HEALTH APOLOGIES
A. Public Health Principles and Apologies
Although many definitions exist for public health, a recent report submitted
to the U.K. Prime Minister defined public health as “the science and art of
preventing disease, prolonging life and promoting health through the
organi[z]ed efforts and informed choices of society, organi[z]ations, public and
private, communities[,] and individuals.”42

38. See generally Vanessa Northington Gamble, Under the Shadow of Tuskegee: African Americans
and Health Care, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1773 (1997).
39. See, e.g., Nadav Davidovitch & Avital Margalit, Public Health, Racial Tensions, and Body
Politic: Mass Ringworm Irradiation in Israel, 1949–1960, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 522 (2008) (utilizing
case study of Israeli experience with ringworm).
40. For a discussion of public apologies and their relation to reconciliation and justice, see
ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITUTION AND NEGOTIATING HISTORICAL
INJUSTICE (2000); MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY
AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 91–117 (1998); ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL
JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST–CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA, 51–52, 192–96 (1999);
THE AGE OF APOLOGY: FACING UP TO THE PAST 13–255 (Mark Gibney et al. eds., 2008); WHEN
SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN
INJUSTICE (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999); Richard B. Bilder, The Role of Apology in International Law and
Diplomacy, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 433, 449–63 (2006); Kathleen A. Gill, The Moral Functions of an
Apology, in INJUSTICE AND RECTIFICATION 111, 120–22 (Rodney C. Roberts ed., 2002); Trudy Govier
& Wilhelm Verwoerd, Taking Wrongs Seriously: A Qualified Defence of Public Apologies, 65 SASK. L.
REV. 139, 140–44 (2002).
41. Eric K. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 47, 53 (1997).
42. DEREK WANLESS, SECURING GOOD HEALTH FOR THE WHOLE POPULATION 3 (2004).
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The principles of public health, as distinct from those of clinical medicine,
are based on a population approach.43 Additional important components
include the following: (1) an upstream focus (primary prevention and health
promotion); (2) the targeting of a broad range of forces (physical, biological,
social, economic, political, and environmental) that affect populations and
cause diseases; and (3) the strategic modification of social and environmental
variables and the promotion of public health through active social and political
involvement.44 This strategy contrasts sharply with that of “traditional” modern
medicine, especially as practiced in hospitals.45
Public health maintenance is a function of the complex relationship between
the social actions of the state, various institutions, and groups of citizens.
Dorothy Porter, a historian of medicine and public health, wrote, “In the
modern period, the study of the operation of power in relation to population
health necessarily involves an examination of the rise of the modern state as an
autonomous political sphere.”46 This involves understanding the “different
interpretations, made in different periods, of the rights and obligations of
citizens within the ‘social contract’ of health between the state and civil society
in modern democracies.”47 Therefore, the analysis of public health policies and
practices “is concerned largely with social, economic, and political relations of
health between classes, social structures and organizations, pressure groups,
polities and state.”48
As can be inferred from these descriptions of the public health approach,
the approach already contains the cultural and collective concerns which we
determined are missing from the clinical discourse. Public health thinking
addresses the group rather than the individual. It is also aware of the ideological
and cultural background that exists in any case where assumingly neutral
healthcare policies are applied. More than that, public health concerns focus
very much on prevention and upstream thinking; in the context of apologies,
such an approach would strive primarily to prevent the offensive conduct or the
medical error altogether or make sure it will never recur. A unique application
of the public health approach in cases of apology that captures the potential and
limitations of apology from a cultural perspective is the study of public

43. Cf. Nadav Davidovitch & Michal Alberstein, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Public Health: A
Broad Perspective on Dialogue, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 507 (2008) (discussing these principles with
respect to another alternative movement, the Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approach).
44. INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY 52–53 (2003).
This publication also provides a general overview of public health characteristics.
45. For a discussion of the tensions between public health and clinical medicine, see Allan M.
Brandt & Martha Gardner, Antagonism and Accommodation: Interpreting the Relationship Between
Public Health and Medicine in the United States During the 20th Century, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 707,
708, 711 (2000).
46. DOROTHY PORTER, HEALTH, CIVILIZATION AND THE STATE: A HISTORY OF PUBLIC
HEALTH FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1999).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 4.
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apologies following collective trauma caused by mass application of public
health policies.
B. Public Apologies in Response to Collective Trauma Caused by Public
Health Activities
Declared symbolic acts, such as a public apology, are deemed to be part of
the social construction and implementation of social healing and rehabilitation
mechanisms. The past few decades have witnessed a wave of apologies and
requests for forgiveness by states, both at international and domestic policy
levels.49 The primary functions of an apology of this type are (1) restoration of
human dignity that has been damaged, (2) reestablishing social relations that
have been damaged as a result of the dispute, and (3) rehabilitation of the
community. The apology enables renewed thinking about the system of
relationships, the common past, and the good that has been put at risk as a
consequence of the dispute. A public apology by the state that caused the injury
is not directed solely toward the victims, but also toward the ruling bodies and
society as a whole, and it bears a message of commitment to change and the
strengthening of a system of common values. In the eyes of those who believe in
the possible existence of a social healing process, this healing is the core of the
primary value of an apology.
A public apology operates in the symbolic dimension. In certain instances, it
is possible that an apology alone will be sufficient to permit healing and the
mending of rifts. The receipt of compensation without an apology may be
perceived as an additional injury by the victims. However, an apology without
compensation or other actions testifying to a change in social attitude and
structure may be considered a gesture empty of content—a cynical act that
attempts to evade the payment of material compensation or “mere words.”
Such an empty apology may, under certain circumstances, constitute an even
greater injury to the victims than an absence of apology altogether.
Trust in the healthcare system can be broken when medical errors occur and
healthcare providers do not openly acknowledge their responsibility for the
resulting harm to patients. As discussed above, an appropriate apology can be a
first step in the reconciliation process between a harmed patient and a
healthcare provider. Similarly, confidence in the public health system may be
eroded when legally sanctioned medical initiatives—undertaken in the name of
the public’s health—result in harm to their intended targets but are not
officially acknowledged. Such an act might produce a collective trauma—a
psychic wound spread among an entire community—which affects the identity
construction and self-esteem of the individuals within the affected group.50
49. For an overview of state apologies, see generally JENNIFER LIND, SORRY STATES: APOLOGIES
IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (2008).

50. For an elaboration of the notion of collective trauma and its various manifestations, see Austin
Sarat et al., Trauma and Memory: Between Individual and Collective Experiences, in TRAUMA AND
MEMORY: READING, HEALING, AND MAKING LAW 3, 3–20 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2007).
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Healing collective trauma requires restorative processes that help the group to
overcome the horrific experience through a variety of reconstructive acts.51
The best-known recent public health apology, introduced here as a
paradigm for an enriched notion of apology, was given by President Bill Clinton
on May 16, 1997, for the Tuskegee Syphilis study, the forty-year government
study (1932 through 1972) in which 399 African-Americans from Macon
County, Alabama, were deliberately denied effective treatment for syphilis in
order to document the natural history of the disease.52 The infamous Tuskegee
Syphilis study became one of the cornerstones of modern bioethics, a symbol
for the deception of a disempowered community, as African-Americans who
contracted syphilis were not informed of their disease and were denied
treatment while participating in an observational study.
An important impetus for Clinton’s apology was the continuing shadow cast
by the study on African-Americans’ relationship with the healthcare system,
including the impediment of efforts to improve the health of the AfricanAmerican community, African-Americans’ distrust of the medical system as
expressed in low participations in clinical trials and organ donation, and, more
importantly, interference with public health campaigns such as HIV and AIDS
prevention and treatment programs. The shadow of Tuskegee was invoked to
explain why many African-Americans oppose, for example, needle exchange
programs. These programs provoked the image of the syphilis study and
sparked African-Americans’ fears about genocide, leading to perception of
these programs, not as efforts to stop the spread of HIV and AIDS, but rather,
as a plot to intentionally spread the drug epidemic within the African-American
community. This mistrust predates public exposure of the trial: fears of
exploitation by the medical profession date back to the context of slavery and

51. Nadav Davidovitch & Avital Margalit, Public Health, Law and Traumatic Collective
Experiences: The Case of Mass Ringworm Irradiations, in TRAUMA AND MEMORY: READING,
HEALING, AND MAKING LAW 119, 134–35 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2007). A recent apology that
includes many necessary components presented in this part but will not be discussed in this article is the
Canadian Red Cross apology for the blood tragedy during the 1980s that disastrously resulted in AIDS
epidemics among hemophiliacs and blood transfusion recipients. Pierre Duplessis, Sec’y Gen. & Chief
Exec. Officer, Canadian Red Cross, Public Statement (May 30, 2005) (transcript available at
http://www.redcross.ca/main.asp?id=013578). The scandal had a profound impact on public trust in the
Canadian blood system. Following the tragedy, a commission was established, and, in 2005, the
Canadian Red Cross pleaded guilty in Ontario Superior Court. See also BLOOD FEUDS: AIDS, BLOOD,
AND THE POLITICS OF MEDICAL DISASTER (Eric A. Feldman & Ronald Bayer eds., 1999).
52. Many books and articles have been published on the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. See, e.g.,
TUSKEGEE’S TRUTHS: RETHINKING THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY (Susan M. Reverby ed., 2000)
(providing a detailed history of these events, from the inception of the study to the apology of Clinton
and incorporating many primary sources and reflections on the events). In his formal apology at the
White House Ceremony, President Clinton said, “The legacy of the study at Tuskegee has reached far
and deep, in ways that hurt our progress and divide our nation. We cannot be one America when a
whole segment of our nation has no trust in America.” Press Release, The White House, Office of the
Press Secretary, Remarks by the President in Apology for Study Done in Tuskegee (May 16, 1997). See
also Tuskegee Public Health Study Apology, C-SPAN VIDEO LIBRARY (May 16, 1997), http://www.cspanvideo.org/program/81273-1 (providing videorecording of President Clinton’s apology).
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African-American collective memories.53 Yet the Tuskegee Syphilis trial
became a symbol for the mistreatment of the African-American community,
and more generally, of ethical misconduct by medical researchers and public
health practitioners.54
Despite the impressive symbolic appearance of this apology, it is important
to note that it took place twenty-five years after the public disclosure of the
Tuskegee study and was predated by a lawsuit, denial of material allegations of
the complaint by the government, meticulous data gathering about the
misconduct of health professionals within the study, and a final settlement. As
in other, similar cases of public health misconduct, the government’s initial
reaction was not apology but rather rejection and denial: the government first
claimed that the action was barred due to the statute of limitations and next
claimed that the injuries and damages were caused without fault, carelessness,
or negligence.55 The government did not deny the study itself, but its initial
position in the years following the public disclosure was that of acute denial:
denial of injuries, damages, and fault. About eighteen months after submission
of the initial class action lawsuit, a settlement was reached, and the government
agreed to pay approximately $10 million to living participants in the study and
heirs of those deceased. The study was also an important impetus leading to the
1974 federal law protecting human research subjects.56
Despite the legal settlement and enactment of new legislation regarding
human experimentation, the shadow of Tuskegee continued to grow, as
expressed in the African-American community’s distrust of healthcare
professionals as well as continuous debate among researchers, writers, ethicists,
and activists. The apology described above arrived only years later in response
to demands of the victims and their families and after acknowledgement that
not enough had been done to overcome this collective trauma. In 1995, a legacy
committee was formed to demand a formal apology from the federal
government. Interestingly, their demand for apology was accompanied by a
request for funding for a bioethics center at Tuskegee University. The legacy
committee pointed to the continuous distrust between the African-American
and medical communities, saying that “[i]n the almost twenty-five years since its
disclosure, the [s]tudy has moved from a singular historical event to a powerful
metaphor. It has come to symbolize racism in medicine, ethical misconduct in
human research, paternalism by physicians and government abuse of vulnerable
people.”57 In their demand, the committee pointed to two then-recent apologies:
the U.S. government’s apology for its role in human radiation experiments

53. Gamble, supra note 38, at 1773–76.
54. Id. at 1773.
55. Fred Gray, The Lawsuit, in TUSKEGEE’S TRUTHS: RETHINKING THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS
STUDY 473, 480 (Susan M. Reverby ed., 2000).
56. Gamble, supra note 38, at 1776.
57. Legacy Committee Request, reprinted in TUSKEGEE’S TRUTHS: RETHINKING THE TUSKEGEE
SYPHILIS STUDY 559 (Susan M. Reverby ed., 2000).
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(1944 through 1974) and the Southern Baptist Church’s apology to all AfricanAmericans for its stand on slavery during the Civil War.58 The committee
stressed (1) the moral and physical harms done to the community of Macon
County, where the study was conducted; (2) the fact that, although an economic
settlement was reached, no public apology had been made; and (3) the fact that
no public official had ever stated clearly that the study was morally wrong.59
Finally, the committee urged Clinton to apologize on behalf of the American
government for the harms inflicted at Tuskegee and direct the apology to the
elderly survivors of the trial, their families and the wider community of
Tuskegee, and more broadly, to “all people of color whose lives reverberate
with the consequence of the [s]tudy.”60 The committee noted that “this apology
provide[d] the opportunity to begin to heal the racial wounds that persist in the
county.”61 The suggestion was to issue an apology from Tuskegee University
linked with a meeting of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission.62 The
committee stressed:
Although a public apology is necessary to heal the wounds . . ., it alone w[ill] not be
sufficient to assure the nation that research like the Tuskegee Syphilis Study will not
be duplicated. Despite the significance of a Presidential apology, it must not be an
isolated event. Consequently, the Committee also recommends the development of a
mechanism to move beyond Tuskegee and to address the effects of its legacy. The
Committee strongly urges the development of a professionally-staffed Center at
Tuskegee University, focused on preserving the national memory of the Study and
63
transforming its legacy.

The center, which just celebrated its tenth anniversary, aimed to change the
negative legacy of Tuskegee into a positive symbol demonstrating the
importance of acknowledging past wrongs, rebuilding trust, and practicing
ethical research. In the ceremony at the White House, which hosted the
remaining survivors, Herman Shaw, who was about to celebrate his ninety-fifth
birthday, spoke of the trauma and its healing potential as expressed both in the
formal apology and the equally important creation of the memorial in
Tuskegee, thus “clos[ing] this very tragic and painful chapter in [their] lives.”64
Clinton’s speech following Shaw’s statement acknowledged responsibility and
the importance of moving from apology to the next step of rebuilding trust by
(1) building a memorial at Tuskegee, including a center for bioethics; (2) calling
on the Secretary of Health and Human Services to issue a report on how the
government could best involve communities in research and healthcare, with an

58. Id. at 560.
59. Id. at 560–61.
60. Id. at 562.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Legacy Committee Request, supra note 57.
64. Herman Shaw, Living Participant in Tuskegee Syphilis Study, Remarks (May 16, 1997)
(transcript available in TUSKEGEE’S TRUTHS: RETHINKING THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY 572
(Susan M. Reverby ed., 2000)).
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emphasis on minority communities; and (3) strengthening researchers’ training
in bioethics.65
When analyzing the Tuskegee apology and comparing it to other apologies
in the healthcare system, a few lessons emerge: first, a legal resolution is not
enough. In contrast to the common clinical setting of apologieswhich assumes
apologies are used in order to avoid legal procedures and that legal action,
especially resolution in favor of the plaintiff, is a sufficient substitute for
apology66the Tuskegee case proves that legal settlement of the dispute is not
enough to resolve the conflict and heal the trauma. In this case, although the
government initially denied responsibility in the class action suits by claiming a
statutory bar and lack of fault, damages were finally paid to the survivors and
their families. Still, the monetary reparation was not enough: apology was
required after the dispute was both considered and settled. The apology in the
Tuskegee case effected what formal legal management could not and enabled
real transformation and social healing.
Second, there was significant cultural sensitivity and community
involvement in framing the apology in the Tuskegee case. The demand for
apology came from the legacy committee, which represented the victims, and
the committee framed the content and process according to their own
sensitivities, including the requirement to establish a bioethics center. When the
victims take part in constructing and conducting the apology ceremony and it
answers their cultural sensitivities, there is a real chance for transformation and
reconciliation.
Third, apology in the Tuskegee case was given only as one step among
multiple combined efforts to restore trust, bring conciliation, and prevent future
harms of this kind. The response included reparation, establishment of the
bioethics center, active dialogue between communities, and the construction of
educational programs and memorial sites. Such hybridization of intervening
mechanisms is typical of a discourse of alternative dispute resolution (ADR)67
and helps to enhance a complex transformation of structural conflicts.
Fourth, in the Tuskegee case, there was a sensitive contextualization of the
concrete apology within the historical and sociological aspects of race relations
in the United States and the role of the medical establishment. Apology was
perceived as addressing the collective trauma and not only as answering the
individual victims’ harm.
Finally, as in many other ADR areas today, the Tuskegee case challenges
the usual private–public divide, which depicts ADR as private ordering in the
shadow of the public law. Indeed, a closer look at this case reveals a pattern of

65. William J. Clinton, President of the United States, Remarks by the President in Apology for
Study Done in Tuskegee (May 16, 1997) (transcript available in TUSKEGEE’S TRUTHS: RETHINKING
THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY 576 (Susan M. Reverby ed., 2000)).
66. See supra Part I.
67. See, e.g., Michal Alberstein, ADR and Transitional Justice as Reconstructing the Rule of Law, J.
DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 6).

ALBERSTEIN & DAVIDOVITCH

168

4/29/2011

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 74:151

what is defined today in the international sphere as “transitional justice.” The
concept of transitional justice represents a systematic response to widespread
human rights violations and is usually used in relation to democracies in
transition striving to implement the rule of law.68 The restorative process
described above was not only a mediation between the Tuskegee victims and
the state as offender, but should instead be viewed as an effort to promote
transformations of legal regimes and cultural divides through establishment of
hybrid mechanisms. It strives for care and justice within a constructivist futureoriented intervention. When developed and brought into the clinical sphere,
such a perspective might be capable of answering some of the challenges and
problems that the clinical practice of apology faces today.
More recent public health apologies in the United States were much less
successful. The case of sterilization, for example, was traumatic and well-known,
but not enough restorative acts were done to overcome it. For several decades
up until the 1970s, tens of thousands of people were sterilized according to the
law in the United States and other countries. This practice was perceived as
beneficial under the eugenic theories prevalent in the medical community at the
time. The U.S. Supreme Court decision of Buck v. Bell affirmed the practice of
sterilization under a public health justification, comparing forced sterilization to
the logic of compulsory vaccination.69
During the last decade, seven U.S. states conducted ceremonies of apologies
connected to historical events such as anniversaries of sterilization laws. In
some cases, the ceremonies included people who were sterilized as part of those
traumatic events, thus giving a symbolic meaning to the formal apology. Yet
despite extensive recent media coverage, no U.S. state has ever paid reparation
to the victims of sterilization laws. Not all of the apologies included
acknowledgement of full responsibility, and some state representatives were
ready to express only regret while justifying the harmful conduct as done in
accordance with public health measures as practiced at the time.70
Just recently, another public apology was made for U.S. syphilis
experiments conducted in Guatemala. From 1946 through 1948, American
public health doctors deliberately infected about 700 Guatemalans—prison
inmates, mental patients, and soldiers—with venereal diseases in order to test
the effectiveness of penicillin. On October 1, 2010, U.S. Secretary of State,
Hillary Rodham Clinton, and Health and Human Services Secretary, Kathleen
Sebelius, apologized to the government of Guatemala and the survivors and

68. Id. at 4, 14. See generally 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES
RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 3–41 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995).
69. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
70. PAUL A. LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME
COURT AND BUCK V. BELL 259–60, 264–65 (2008). Other countries such as Sweden and Canada have
legislated compensation laws. Id. at 265–66.
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descendants of those infected.71 While official Guatemalan representatives
thanked the United States for its transparency in telling the facts, material
consequences of the apology’s declaration, such as reparations for survivors or
descendants, are still unclear.
Some cases of public health collective trauma are treated by the state only
through reparations, without proper apology. This was the case with the Israeli
case of compensation for mass ringworm irradiation.72 A reconciliation of Israeli
medical and non-medical establishments and former Jewish immigrants mainly
from North Africa and other Arab states resulted, among other things, in a legal
apparatus established for compensation which failed to deliver the original
healing intentions. Between 1949 and 1960, the newly established state of Israel
instituted a public health program of ringworm treatment of immigrants. The
treatment involved irradiating the scalp of all persons suspected of having
ringworm. At the time, this treatment was recognized by mainstream medicine;
however, it had physical and social consequences. While ringworm cases in the
immigrant population decreased as a result of the treatment, the harsh
treatment involved stigma and separation from the family and school for some
weeks. Further, it was discovered that the treated immigrants had a higher risk
of developing head and neck cancers as a result of the irradiation.
The individuals who began tort litigation against the government
encountered procedural and substantive barriers such as the statute of
limitations and the inability to prove negligence on the part of the government
necessary for compensation. The burden of proof for negligence was high since
irradiation of the scalp was accepted as common medical practice at the time.
As a result, many immigrants who pursued compensation on an individual tort
claim basis were denied. The Ringworm Victims Association, a group
established to lead a militant campaign for compensation, forced the state to
reevaluate the law and enter into active discussions with the victims. In 1994,
Israel passed compensation laws to evaluate and compensate remaining
survivors of the irradiation by evaluating damages and claims.73 This law, while a
step toward reconciliation, was individualistic and not collectivist in approach
and did not address the social and historical context that led to the legislation.
Although the legislation addressed the shortcomings of tort claims, it did not

71. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., U.S. Apologizes for Syphilis Tests in Guatemala, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/02/health/research/02infect.html?_r=1. The
secretaries’ official statement stated, “Although these events occurred more than 64 years ago, we are
outraged that such reprehensible research could have occurred under the guise of public health. . . . We
deeply regret that it happened, and we apologize to all the individuals who were affected by such
abhorrent research practices.” Id. The public health doctor who led this experiment, John C. Cutler,
played an important role also in the Tuskegee study. See Susan M. Reverby, “Normal Exposure” and
Inoculation Syphilis: A PHS “Tuskegee” Doctor in Guatemala, 1946–1948, 23 J. POL’Y HIST. 6–28
(2011).
72. For a discussion of this case from historical, medical, and legal perspectives, see Davidovitch &
Margalit, supra note 51, at 119–65.
73. Id. at 120.
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include words acknowledging a wrongdoing. From the government’s
perspective, the law was a gracious offering to remedy harm.
However, what would happen if the government took a collectivist approach
and apologized to the groups? What if a museum or some sort of public
memorial was built to atone for the harm? These questions remain unanswered
as debates continue. It is clear that, for a public health apparatus to maintain its
viability and integrity, confidence must be restored in the public health system.
An apology can be a crucial step in restoring this public trust.
Nevertheless, the success of an apology for public health collective trauma
can never be guaranteed, even when its conditions are fully observed. This was
the case with the apologies given by the Max Plank Society (MPS) to a group of
holocaust survivors that took part in Nazi medical experiments. The event was
preceded by a formal announcement in 2001 by Hubert Markl, president of
MPS, in which MPS acknowledged that the management and staff of its
predecessor society, Kaiser Wilhelm Society, were involved in Nazi war
atrocities and apologized to their victims. The apology was issued “in response
to the findings of a group of science historians commissioned in 1999 to
investigate the role played by basic researchers of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society
during the Second World War.”74 Kaiser Wilhelm scientists joined with the Nazi
regime in their eugenic and racial purification program. As physician and
medical historian William Seidelman wrote, “The resulting collaboration
between science and the Nazi state not only legitimized the policies and
programs of the Hitler regime[,] it resulted in the exploitation and mutilation
and murder of untold thousands of innocent victims by physicians and scientists
associated with some of the world’s leading universities and research
institutes.”75
MPS invited the living survivors of Nazi experiments for a ceremony in June
2001, but most of the survivors could not accept the apology,76 either because of
doubt as to whether they were entitled to represent the other victims or because
the trauma was so severe as to be incapable of reconstruction through apology.

74. Alison Abbott, Max Planck Society Admits to Its Predecessor’s Nazi Links, 411 NATURE 726,
726 (2001). See also Robert Koenig, Max Planck Offers Historic Apology, 292 SCIENCE 1979, 1979–80
(2001).
75. William E. Seidelman, Science and Inhumanity: The Kaiser-Wilhelm/Max Planck Society, 2 IF
NOT NOW E-JOURNAL (Winter 2001), http://www.baycrest.org/If_Not_Now/Volume_2_Winter_2001/
default_7356.asp#.
76. As documented in the film Forgiving Dr. Mengele (First Run Features 2006). The movie tells
the story of Eva Mozes Kor, a survivor of Josef Mengele’s cruel twin experiments in the Auschwitz
concentration camp, who unlike most other survivors decided to forgive the perpetrators as a method
of self-healing. In 1993, Kor met with Doctor Hans Munch, a Nazi doctor at Auschwitz who was
acquitted at the Krakow War Crimes trial in 1947. After this meeting, which she recorded on video and
showed in the documentary, she wrote Dr. Munch a letter of forgiveness. They met again in 1995 at
Auschwitz, where Dr. Munch signed a documentation of the gas chambers, and Kor issued a
declaration of amnesty and forgiveness to all Nazis. See also Kevin Thomas, Movie Review, ‘Forgiving
Dr. Mengele’, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2006, available at http://www.calendarlive.com/printedition/
calendar/cl-et-mengele17nov17,0,6043445.story.
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Later compensation schemes established for victims of medical experiments
could not add the needed dimension for collective healing.
As these various examples of public health apologies indicate, apologies in
public health cannot be a panacea for regaining social trust. Apologies must be
perceived in a much broader context, and reframing the previously stipulated
conditions for individualistic apology might help in furthering understanding of
their operation. Eric Yamamoto, who deals with the processes of social
mending and healing in the context of interracial relationships in the United
States, proposes an approach of conceptualization that can help us think about
the appropriate conception of apology as mediation between cultures.77 He
suggests four concepts that, taken together, permit construction of a process for
collective restorative justice.78
The first concept, recognition, signifies recognition that injustice and injury
have occurred, as well as acknowledging the pain and suffering of the victims
with empathy. This concept is an extension of the first condition for apology
described supra Part I, which deals with acknowledgment of the infringement of
the rule or moral duty.79 Recognition consists of identifying and critically
examining the various positions of the parties, both individually and as a group.
The second concept, responsibility, indicates an assessment of group agency
and acceptance of responsibility for the injustices and injury. It goes together
with the second condition within interpersonal relationships of accepting
responsibility when wrongs occur.
The third concept is reconstruction, which requires taking substantial steps
toward healing the social wounds. An apology by the party who caused the
injury is the major tool for reconstruction, and, in appropriate cases, forgiveness
is received from the injured party. The purpose of these steps is to establish a
renewed understanding of the past by society. This relates to expressing
remorse in individual apologies and accepting forgiveness, in some cases.80 In
collective apologies, such a stage can look like an official declaration in an
authoritative location such as a parliament or the site of the trauma.81 It can
involve local public hearings where offenders apologize and receive amnesty
and victims forgive, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South
Africa.82

77. YAMAMOTO, supra note 40, at 10–11, 174–209.
78. Id. The notion of restorative justice, which is usually used in the criminal context, “emphasizes
repairing the harm caused by crime. When victims, offenders, and community members meet to decide
how to do that, the results can be transformational.” RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ONLINE, http://www
.restorativejustice.org (last visited Jan. 27, 2011). For a review of the process and its stages, see
HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (2002).
79. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 52–65 and accompanying text (referring to the Tuskegee apology conducted at
the White House).
82. Justice in Transition Booklet Explaining the Role of the TRC, OFFICIAL TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION WEBSITE, http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/legal/justice.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).

ALBERSTEIN & DAVIDOVITCH

172

4/29/2011

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 74:151

The fourth entails the concept of reparation, which parallels the fourth
condition for apology,83 and is closely connected to the concept of
reconstruction and deals with the attempt to heal the material injury caused to
the victims.
Through these four concepts, it is possible to examine proposals for methods
of social healing and resolution in order to understand whether, and to what
extent, these apologies may be able to address the cultural contexts underlying
them. Such an examination requires consideration of two central questions. The
first is a question of the relationship between the symbolic dimensions of the
process and its material dimensions. The second is a question as to the nature of
legal means for realizing the various dimensions of the process.
Under this approach, law is considered a proper mechanism for mending the
social fabric, and emphasis on community and healing gives less importance to
the articulation of blame and the existence of malice or clear negligence.
Accordingly, although state actions through routine public health activities are
supposed to be performed with cultural blindness and with due care, the
injurious and harmful effects of these practices are sometimes perceived as
racist and biased. Addressing these perceptions in a constructive, healing
manner requires a “culturally sensitive apology” approach which serves as a
primary—not alternative—method for legal intervention. The four concepts
presented above create a framework for discourse regarding the important
question concerning the relationship between the symbolic dimension in the
process of healing and its material dimension.
All of the concepts require the existence of a symbolic dimension, whereas
the material dimension is to be found only in the concept of reparations. These
concepts also assist in understanding the tension between the personal
dimensions and the collective and social dimensions of the social healing
process. As the Tuskegee case shows, it took twenty-five years to add symbolic
dimensions, as expressed in the formal apology and construction of a memorial
to the victims, based on a strong foundation of understanding of the historical
and sociological aspects of the traumatic events for the African-American
community.
The symbolic dimension may be declared–explicit or inferred–implicit. A
declared symbolic aspect may be represented, for example, by an explicit
admission of responsibility by an official entity on behalf of the State for the
injustice or an apology by the one who caused the injury. An additional method
includes holding an open dialogue between the injured and injuring parties.
Within the course of such a dialogue, symbolic gestures are made through
discourse: these gestures grant recognition of the injury, deal with the question
of responsibility, and send clear messages of the injuring party’s feelings of
regret and remorse. Community involvement in the construction of the apology

83. See supra Part II.A.
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is crucial to achieving a better understanding of how people construct their own
traumatic events and how they perceive the proper means to heal them.
The material dimension is, in principal, concrete (returning property that
has been stolen, payment of monetary compensation, and so on, although the
repair of material damages may be performed in other ways as well, such as
through reverse discrimination). Nonetheless, each material act conceals a
symbolic dimension as well. Mere performance of the action itself constitutes a
message. This message is not openly declared, but it comprises a constitutive
element of the act’s meaning. The symbolic message is inferred–implied from
the transmission itself. For example, granting compensation may signify a
message of recognition of the injury, an admission of responsibility, and even an
implied request for forgiveness.
The realization of symbolic and material dimensions through specific actions
raises complex questions that cannot be easily answered. For example, there is
the question of whether it is just to demand an apology to the victims from one
who had no personal part in committing the past injustice, or whether it is just
for such a person to bear the burden of material repair. Is it sufficient merely to
belong to a group that, in the past, benefited from the consequences of the
injustice, or should we condition requirement of these specific actions upon the
group members’ continued benefit in the present? Another question focuses on
identifying those toward whom the apology should be directed and those who
are entitled to receive reparations—should they go to the victims as individuals
or as a group? In cases in which the State is the perpetrator of the injury, the
force of some of these questions is diluted by the fact that the State is an entity
whose existence is ongoing. Additionally, the force of the questions is diluted
under circumstances in which the victims are still alive or the memory of the
injury among the victims’ social group is fresh. Under such circumstances, it is
not difficult to locate those who committed the injustices as well as the victims.
It follows from this brief review of the types of issues confronting efforts at
social healing that processes must be designed with great sensitivity to the
factual entirety of traumatic incidents and the complexity of the cultural context
of those affected. Only in this way is it possible—and even then, only in a
relatively limited fashion—to determine a sufficient measure, in terms of both
material and symbolic dimensions, capable of healing and mending social rifts.
The meaning of an apology and its healing power are socially constructed.
However, culture is dynamic. Accordingly, it is possible that, if wide use is made
of the apology and other alternative practices for settling disputes, concepts of
restorative justice will be absorbed into the legal system, the legal culture, and,
if not yet already present, the cultures of the various social groups comprising
society. In any case, new meaning will be assigned to the act of apology and its
relationship to awards of compensation.
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V
APOLOGIES BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: A BROADER ADR
PERSPECTIVE
When reflecting on the argument developed in this article, it becomes clear
that it deals with a divide we tend to find in some other areas of ADR today: a
private alternative practice is developed and nourished within a specific context
of legal disputes. At first, it is suggested as an innovation and an exceptional
treatment of conflicts. Then, it is translated into concrete manuals and actual
practice. Later, it is institutionalized and frequently becomes the norm rather
than the exception. At that stage, some deep problems of cooptation and loss of
faith might develop. On a parallel reality, which may be defined as a public
form of justice, the same exceptional idea which has developed in the private
sphere has already long been familiar. It is the foundation of a legal regime or a
political practice that is mainstreamed and gains popularity.84 Still, since the idea
is practiced only in a symbolic way or without professional training, it
sometimes lacks the sophistication and skill already developed in private
practice. This is actually the case with apologies as described here.
We examine an ongoing clinical practice of apologies which has evolved
from an innovative, pioneering idea into an ongoing practice. This practice
involves training programs and requires concrete legal regulations in order to
increase effectiveness. At times, a practice may become institutionalized;
sometimes, it is co-opted and thus might lose its innovative quality. We find
that, during the last few decades, the idea of apology has inspired states and
public health promoters to use apology within broader healthcare interactions.
Public health apologies are usually given to large populations: they address the
collective and cultural aspect of the healthcare dispute, involve various
ceremonies and considerations, and sometimes fail due to lack of training and
professional knowledge about apologies. In this article, we have tried to put
together these two universes of apology and enrich the discourse of clinical
apologies through discussion of public health apologies. Our main claim is that
the collective, cultural, and organizational aspects of apologies are often
neglected within the clinical discourse and, by addressing them through a more
“public” eye inspired by public health, the current operation of apologies within
clinical practice can improve. Such a sequence can combine with many other
contemporary contributions to ADR scholarship,85 and can contribute to public

84. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Deliberative Democracy and Conflict Resolution: Two
Theories and Practices of Participation in the Polity, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2006, at 18, 18–20.
85. See, e.g., Amy J. Cohen, Revisiting Against Settlement: Some Reflections on Dispute Resolution
and Public Values, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1143 (2009) (reevaluating the 1984 critique of ADR in light of
visions of public values); Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 577 (1997) (considering whether ADR could
constitute state action).
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health studies by offering the practical tools and training for apology as guiding
methods for the issuance of public apologies.86
VI
APOLOGIES IN THE CLINICAL SETTING: SOME CONCLUDING PUBLIC HEALTH
LESSONS
Coming back to the clinical setting, the discussions above can contribute to
an enriched perception of apologies in the healthcare system and may
contribute to a better practice which goes beyond concerns of efficiency and
dispute settlement. First, an increase in cultural sensitivity is important both in
public and private apologies and will help to develop a practice of apology that
is much more case-sensitive and rejects adoption of a uniform manual of
apology making. There is significant value in considering the different
professional and cultural identities involved in the healthcare dispute and
constructing an apology that fills the expectations of all parties involved while
also considering imbalances and cultural differences.
Second, the purpose of apology should be as much the promotion of
solidarity and harmony as saving money or avoiding litigation. This is an
emphasis that should be developed in medical and legal education in general
and apology training in particular. This message fits nicely with organizational
needs to improve equality at the workplace and satisfaction of workers and
patients.
Third, when considering a case of medical error, public health principles of
prevention and policymaking should be part of the apology process.
Apologizing in a full sense includes, as in the Tuskegee case, more constructive
acts of teaching and memorializing, which can assure the patient that his case
has sparked the development of new practices and enhanced ethical thinking. It
also includes the active participation of the affected parties in constructing a
meaningful apology together.
Finally, the more humanistic notions of reconstruction and symbolic
acknowledgment should accompany and supplement the notions of efficiency
and resolution which prevail today within the “apology market.” Apology is
productive, efficient, and definitely improves medical services, but its operation
cannot be fully understood without addressing its non-material dimension—the
aspect which makes hearts turn and transforms perceptions, without reduction
to any manual or calculation.

86. See an equivalent suggestion of Menkel-Meadow regarding deliberative democracy and the
health reform negotiation by Obama in this issue. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Scaling Up Deliberative
Democracy as Dispute Resolution in Healthcare Reform: A Work in Progress, 74 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1 (Summer 2011).

